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Abstract: The article deals with the liability of third-party certifiers in the medical sector
and especially focuses on the role of TüV Rheinland in the recent Poly Implant Prothèse
(PIP) breast implant case. The aim of the contribution is twofold. Firstly, it provides an
overview of the different challenges that courts face when having to decide on the liability
of certifiers of medical devices towards third parties. These, for instance, relate to the
strict conditions under which certifiers can incur third-party liability under national law.
Whether product certifiers can be held liable depends on the jurisdiction where the claims
have been filed. Therefore, the PIP breast implant case is also interesting from a private
international law perspective. Third-party certifiers can be sued before the courts of their
domicile. Whether they can be brought before courts in other Member States depends
inter alia on the interpretation of the place of the damaging event and the place of the
damage. The difficulty to pinpoint these locations not only emerges in the field of
jurisdiction but also manifests itself within the search for the applicable law as identical
connecting factors are employed in that area of private international law. Secondly, the
article examines the decisions that have been issued by national courts in the PIP breast
implant case. Rulings in France and Germany denied compensation for patients who
purchased the defective breast implants. The PIP case is currently pending before the
European Court of Justice (ECJ). It thus remains to be seen what stance the ECJ will take
and especially what the consequences might be for certifiers in the medical sector. Based
on the analysis of these decisions, the contribution puts forth a number of reasons why
the threat of liability seems the most effective way to guarantee that third-party certifiers
issue accurate and reliable certificates. This in turn ensures that only safe medical devices
are placed on the European market and safeguards the health of consumers. Future
scandals with medical devices might in this way be prevented.
Zusammenfassung: Der Beitrag behandelt die Haftung von unabhängigen
Zertifizierungsstellen im medizinischen Bereich und konzentriert sich speziell auf die
Rolle des TÜV Rheinland in dem aktuellen PIP Brustimplantat-Fall. Das Ziel des
Beitrages is zweierlei. Zum einen soll er einen Überblick über die unterschiedlichen
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Herausforderungen, mit denen Gerichte konfrontiert sind, wenn sie über die Haftung von
Zertifizierungsstellen medizinischer Produkte gegenüber Dritten entscheiden, bieten.
Diese Herausforderungen stehen beispielsweise im Zusammenhang mit den strengen
Vorraussetzungen im nationalen Recht, unter denen für eine Zertifizierungsstellen eine
Haftung gegenüber Dritten angenommenwird. Ob eine solcheHaftung entsteht, hängt von
der durch den Ort der Klageeinreichung bestimmten Jurisdiktion ab. Vor diesem
Hintergrund erscheint der PIP Brustimplantat-Fall auch aus der Perspektive des
Internationalen Privatrechts interessant. Unabhängige Zertifizierungsstellen können am
Ort ihres Sitzes gerichtlich verklagt werden. Ob sie auch vor Gerichten anderer
europäischer Mitgliedsstaaten verklagt werden können, hängt inter alia von der
Interpretation des Ortes des schädigenden Ereignisses und des Schadensortes zusammen.
Die Schwierigkeit der Feststellung dieser Orte entsteht nicht nur im Bereich der
Bestimmung der zuständigen Jurisdiktion, sondern manifestiert sich auch bezüglich der
Frage des anwendbaren Rechts, da in diesem Bereich des Internationalen Privatrechts
identische Anknüpfungspunkte zur Anwendung kommen. Zum anderen untersucht der
Beitrag die Urteile, die durch nationale Gerichte im PIP Brustimplantat-Fall ergangen sind.
Gerichtliche Entscheidungen in Frankreich und Deutschland lehnten eine Entschädigung
für Patienten, die die mangelhaften Brustimplantate gekauft hatten, ab. Der PIP-Fall ist
gegenwärtig beim Europäischen Gerichtshof anhängig. Es bleibt daher abzuwarten, welche
Haltung der EuGH einnehmen wird und insbesondere welche Folgen möglicherweise für
Zertifizierungsstellen im medizinischen Bereich entstehen. Auf der Grundlage der Analyse
dieser Entscheidungen zeigt der Beitrag eine Anzahl von Gründen auf, warum die Gefahr
der Haftung der effektivste Weg scheint um zu garantieren, dass unabhängige
Zertifizierungsstellen fehlerfreie und vertrauenswürdige Zertifikate ausstellen. Dies wie-
derum stellt sicher, dass nur sichere medizinische Produkte auf dem europäischen Markt
platziert werden, und schützt die Gesundheit der Verbraucher. Zukünftige Skandale mit
medizinischen Produkten könnten so möglicherweise verhindert werden.
Résumé: L’article traite de la responsabilité des tiers certificateurs dans le secteur
médical et étudie spécialement le rôle de TüV Rheinland dans l’affaire récente des
implants mammaires PIP. L’objectif de la contribution est double. D’abord elle fournit
un aperçu des différents problèmes auxquels les tribunaux font face lorsqu’ils doivent
connaître de la responsabilité de certificateurs de produits médicaux envers des tiers. Il
s’agit, par exemple, des conditions strictes dans lesquelles les certificateurs peuvent
encourir une responsabilité civile vis-à-vis des tiers dans la loi nationale. La mise en
cause de la responsabilité d’un certificateur de produits dépend de la juridiction devant
laquelle les recours ont été intentés. C’est pourquoi l’affaire des implants mammaires PIP
présente également un intérêt du point de vue du droit international privé. Les tiers
certificateurs peuvent être poursuivis devant les tribunaux de leur domicile. La question
de savoir s’ils peuvent être poursuivis devant les tribunaux d’autres Etats membres
dépend entre autres de l’interprétation du lieu du fait dommageable et du lieu du
dommage. La difficulté de localiser ces endroits n’apparaît pas seulement en ce qui
concerne la juridiction mais se manifeste aussi dans la recherche de la loi applicable,
dans la mesure où des facteurs de rattachement identiques sont utilisés dans ce domaine
du droit international privé. Deuxièmement, l’article étudie les jugements de tribunaux
nationaux dans l’affaire des implants mammaires PIP. Des décisions en France et en
Allemagne ont refusé une indemnisation pour des patientes qui avaient reçu les implants
mammaires défectueux. L’affaire PIP est actuellement pendante devant la Cour
européenne de justice. Il reste donc à voir quelle position prendra la CJE et en particulier
quelles pourraient être les conséquences pour les certificateurs dans le secteur médical.
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En se basant sur l’analyse de ces décisions, l’article avance un certain nombre de raisons
pour lesquelles la menace d’encourir une responsabilité semble être le moyen le plus
efficace pour assurer la délivrance, par les tiers certificateurs, de certificats corrects et
fiables. Ce qui permet de garantir que seuls des produits médicaux sûrs sont mis sur le
marché européen et de protèger ainsi la santé des consommateurs. De futurs scandales
concernant des produits médicaux pourraient ainsi être évités.
1. Introduction
1. This article deals with the third-party liability of certifiers in the medical
sector. Despite recent developments in case law, there is (still) not much
scholarship on the role and liability of third-party certifiers in the medical
sector,1 especially in comparison to other certifiers such as classification
societies2 or credit rating agencies (CRAs).3 After a brief discussion of the
different players involved in the field of product safety (s. 2), we give an
1 There are, however, some exceptions: B. VAN LEEUWEN, ‘La responsabilité des organismes notifiés
du fait d’implants mammaires défectueux: TÜV Rheinland devant les tribunaux français et alle-
mands’, 24. R.I.D.E (Revue Internationale de Droit Économique) 2015, p 69; B. VAN LEEUWEN, ‘PIP
Breast Implants, the ElU’s New Approach for Goods and Market Surveillance by Notified Bodies’,
5. EJRR (European Journal of Risk Regulation) 2014, p 338; S.M. SINGH, ‘Symposium on the EU’s
New Medical Device Regulatory Framework What Is the Best Way to Supervise the Quality of
Medical Devices? Searching for a Balance Between Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Regulation’, EJRR
(European Journal of Risk Regulation) 2013, p 465; B.M. FRY, ‘A Reasoned Proposition to a
Perilous Problem: Creating a Government Agency to Remedy the Emphatic Failure of Notified
Bodies in the Medical Device Industry’, 22.Willamette J. Int’l L. & Dispute Res (Willamette Journal
of International Law & Dispute Resolution) 2014, p 161.
2 See in this regard: N. LAGONI, The Liability of Classification Societies (Berlin: Springer 2007), p
380; M.A. MILLER, ‘Liability of Classification Societies from the Perspective of United States Law’,
18. Tul. Mar. L.J. (Tulane Maritime Law Journal) 1997, p 75; J.DE BRUYNE, ‘Liability of
Classification Societies: Cases, Challenges and Future Perspectives’, 45. J. Mar. L. & Com.
(Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce) 2014, pp 181–232 with further references.
3 See in this regard: N.S. ELLIS, L.M. FAIRCHILD & F. D’SOUZA, ‘Is Imposing Liability on Credit Rating
Agencies a Good Idea?: Credit Rating Agency Reform in the Aftermath of the Global Financial
Crisis’, 17. Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. (Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance) 2012, p 175; A.
DARBELLAY, Regulating Credit Rating Agencies (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2013), 296 p; F.
PARTNOY, ‘The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating
Agencies’, 77. Wash. U. L. Q. (Washington University Law Quarterly) 1999, p 619; J.C. COFFEE,
‘Ratings Reform: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly’, 1. H.B.L.R. (Harvard Business Law Review)
2011, p 231; I.H.Y. CHIU, ‘Regulating Credit Rating Agencies in the EU: In Search of a Coherent
Regulatory Regime’, 25. E.B.L.R. (European Business Law Review) 2014, p 269; J.DE BRUYNE,
‘Liability of Credit Rating Agencies Regulatory Changes & Tendencies in Case Law Following the
Financial Crisis’, 3. I.C.C.L.R. (International Company and Commercial Law Review) 2016, p 87;
J. DE BRUYNE & C. VANLEENHOVE, ‘Rating the EU Regulatory Framework on the Liability of Credit
Rating Agencies: Triple A or Junk?’, 4. Edinburgh Student L. Rev. (Edinburgh Student Law
Review) 2015, p 117.
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overview of the challenges that courts face when having to decide on the
liability of third-party certifiers in the medical sector. The focus thereby lies
on the role and liability of certifier TüV Rheinland in the recent Poly Implant
Prothèse (PIP) breast implant scandal. This case illustrates that the liability of
third-party certifiers mainly depends on the jurisdiction where the claims have
been filed. Therefore, the PIP breast implant case also poses challenges in the
field of private international law, especially as to the interpretation of the
place of the damaging event and the place where the damage occurred (s. 3).
Based on an analysis of the decisions that have been issued so far by national
courts in the PIP case, the contribution puts forth a number of reasons why
the threat of holding third-party certifiers liable seems the most effective
way to guarantee that they issue accurate and reliable certificates. This in
turn increases the safety of medical devices and safeguards the health of
their users (s. 4).
2. Standardization, Accreditation and Certification:
What’s in a Name
2. There are several actors involved in the process of guaranteeing that products are
safe. Each of them has different obligations and responsibilities in the field of product
safety. In this regard, a distinction can be made between entities offering services of
standardization (s. 2.1), accreditation (s. 2.2) and certification (s. 2.3). Considering
that certification in the medical sector is the main focus of this article, particular
attention is given to so-called notified bodies. These bodies are involved as third-party
certifiers in the conformity assessment procedure of medical devices (s. 2.4).
2.1. Standardization and Standard-Setting Bodies
3. The first major players offering their services in the field of product safety are
standard-setting bodies. They develop technical and safety standards that products or
their manufactures have to comply with. The International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) is the most prominent example in this regard. The ISO is an
independent non-governmental organization and the world’s largest developer of
standards. The ISO already adopted more than 20,500 standards in different sectors.
ISO-standards provide guidelines for products, services and systems to ensure their
quality, safety and efficiency.4 Besides the ISO 9,000 family, addressing aspects of
quality management,5 and ISO17065, containing requirements for entities that certify
4 International Organization for Standardization, About ISO, www.iso.org/iso/home/about.htm
(accessed 26 Sep. 2016).
5 International Organization for Standardization, ISO 9000 – Quality Management, www.iso.org/
iso/home/standards/management-standards/iso_9000.htm (accessed 26 Sep. 2016).
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products, services and processes,6 specific ISOs have been adopted in the field of
medical devices. For example, ISO 13485 contains requirements regarding the quality
management system of manufacturers of medical devices.7 Under this ISO, manufac-
tures have to demonstrate that they are able to design and produce devices that meet
the applicable (safety and technical) requirements.8 In addition to the ISO operating at
the international level, three European Standardization Organizations establish and
develop standards at the supranational level, namely the European Committee for
Standardization (CEN),9 the European Committee for Electrotechnical
Standardization (CENELEC)10 and the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI).1112 Finally, there are also national standard-setting bodies. In this
regard, there is a difference between national standard bodies (NSBs) and standard
developing organizations (SDOs).13 Whereas the NSBs coordinate the national stan-
dard-setting process, SDOs develop the actual content of the standards.14
2.2. Accreditation and Accreditation Bodies
4. The second important group of actors contributing to the safety of products are
accreditation bodies. Accreditation is the ‘third-party attestation related to a con-
formity assessment body conveying formal demonstration of its competence to carry
out specific conformity assessment tasks’.15 Accreditation is thus one step higher
6 International Organization for Standardization, ISO/IEC 17065:2012,www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_
detail?csnumber=46568 (accessed 26 Sep. 2016).
7 EMERGO Group, What Is ISO 13485 Certification?, www.emergogroup.com/resources/articles/
what-is-iso-13485-certification (accessed 26 Sep. 2016); BSI, Quality Management System (QMS)
ISO 13485 Certification, www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/medical-devices/our-services/iso-13485/
(accessed 26 Sep. 2016).
8 International Organization for Standardization, ISO 13485:2003,www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_
detail?csnumber=36786 (accessed 26 Sep. 2016).
9 See for more information: www.cen.eu/about/RoleEurope/Pages/default.aspx (accessed 26 Sep. 2016).
10 See for more information: www.cenelec.eu/ (accessed 26 Sep. 2016).
11 See for more information: www.etsi.org/ (accessed 26 Sep. 2016).
12 Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Oct. 2012 on
European standardization, amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and
Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC,
2009/23/EC and 2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing
Council Decision 87/95/EEC and Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council, OJL 316, 14 Nov. 2012.
13 The ISO gathers national standard bodies within an international framework, namely one for each
country. See International Organization for Standardization, ISO Members, www.iso.org/iso/
about/iso_members.htm (accessed 26 Sep. 2016).
14 Durham College, Standards: Standards Bodies, guides.library.durhamcollege.ca/c.php?
g=316842&p=2116950.
15 Clause 3.1. in International Organization for Standardization, ISO/IEC 17011:2004 Conformity
Assessment – General Requirements for Accreditation Bodies Accrediting Conformity Assessment
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than the actual certification of products.16 One could, therefore, say that accred-
itation bodies are guarding the guards in the sense that they guarantee that
certifiers are competent to perform their certification functions. Accreditation is
not always compulsory and non-accreditation does not necessarily mean that a
third-party certifier is incompetent. However, the accreditation of certifiers pro-
vides an independent confirmation of their competence which is likely to be relied
upon by purchasers of products.17
Accreditation bodies use different criteria to determine whether third-party
certifiers are capable to perform certification functions.18 Those criteria, for
instance, include ISO 17021 (certification of management systems),19 ISO 17065
(requirements for bodies certifying products, processes and services)20 and ISO
17024 (requirements for bodies certifying persons).21 Accreditation bodies them-
selves demonstrate that they are competent by showing compliance with the stan-
dards lied down in ISO 17011 (e.g. on impartiality and management).22
As is the case for standard-setters, accreditation bodies operate at different
levels. For instance, the International Accreditation Forum (IAF) gathers bodies
that accredit third-party certifiers of management systems, products, services and
personnel. The primary function of the IAF is to develop a single and global
program which assures parties that the certificates they use are issued by accredited
certifiers.23 The International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC) is an
international organization for bodies involved in the accreditation of medical test-
Bodies, 1 Sept. 2004, www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=29332 (accessed 26 Sep.
2016).
16 R. MUSE, ‘What’s in a Name: Accreditation vs. Certification?’, Quality Magazine, 2 June 2008, www.
qualitymag.com/articles/85483-what-s-in-a-name-accreditation-vs-certification (accessed 26 Sep. 2016).
17 International Organization for Standardization, Certification, www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/
certification.htm (accessed 26 Sep. 2016).
18 International Accreditation Forum, About Us, www.iaf.nu//articles/About/2 (accessed 26 Sep. 2016).
19 International Organization for Standardization, ISO/IEC 17021-1:2015. Conformity Assessment –
Requirements for Bodies Providing Audit and Certification of Management Systems – Part 1:
Requirements, www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=61651 (accessed 26 Sep. 2016).
20 International Organization for Standardization, ISO/IEC 17065:2012. Conformity Assessment –
Requirements for Bodies Certifying Products, Processes and Services, www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_
detail.htm?csnumber=46568 (accessed 26 Sep. 2016).
21 International Organization for Standardization, ISO/IEC 17024:2012. Conformity Assessment –
General Requirements for Bodies Operating Certification of Persons, www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_
detail?csnumber=52993 (accessed 26 Sep. 2016).
22 International Organization for Standardization, ISO/IEC 17011:2004. Conformity Assessment –
General Requirements for Accreditation Bodies Accrediting Conformity Assessment Bodies. See in
this regard also: EEFC Energy, Product Verification & Certification Division, eefcenergy.com/
product-verification-certification-division/.
23 International Accreditation Forum, IAF Membership, www.iaf.nu/articles/IAF_Membership_/33
(accessed 26 Sep. 2016).
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ing laboratories and inspection bodies.24 At the supranational level, European
Union (EU) Regulation 765/2008 contains requirements that have to be followed
by national public authorities when accrediting third-party certifiers. In this regard,
the European co-operation for Accreditation (EA) is responsible for managing the
peer assessment between national accreditation bodies and monitors their respon-
sibilities and functioning.25
2.3. Certification Process and Third-Party Certifiers in General
5. Certifiers also contribute considerably to the safety of products. They attest that a
certified product possesses certain qualifications or meets particular safety or technical
standards.26 The certification process can take different forms and often involves several
parties. First-party certification implies that the certification process is carried out by the
manufacturers of the products themselves. It is thus a form of self-certification in the
sense that the party thatmarkets the products (e.g. themanufacturer of medical devices)
determines whether they comply with the applicable standards.27 Second-party certifica-
tion, on the other hand, occurs when a person or organization interested in a particular
product (e.g. purchasers of medical devices) examines whether the product meets the
applicable safety and technical standards.28 Finally, third-party certification is performed
by organizations which are independent vis-à-vis the entity that is manufacturing the
products. Such certification occurs at the end of the design or production process when
an independent body establishes whether the product complies with the applicable
technical and safety standards or requirements.29 Most certified products bear the
certifier’s mark to help consumers or other parties make decisions.30 The certificate
24 International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation, About ILAC, ilac.org/about-ilac/.
25 Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008
setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of
products, OJ L218, 13 Aug. 2008.
26 B.A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (St. Paul: West 2009), pp 220–221; D. Greenberg, Jowitt’s
Dictionary of English Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2010), pp 304–305. Also see the definition
of ‘to certify’ in Oxford English Dictionary, 3th ed. 2010.
27 American National Standards Institute, U.S. Conformity Assessment System: 1st Party Conformity
Assessment, www.standardsportal.org/usa_en/conformity_assessment/suppliers_declaration.aspx
(accessed 26 Sep. 2016).
28 American National Standards Institute, U.S. Conformity Assessment System: 2nd Party Conformity
Assessment, www.standardsportal.org/usa_en/conformity_assessment/2party_conformity_assess
ment.aspx; European Federation of National Associations of Measurement (Testing and
Analytical Laboratories), ‘First-, Second- and Third-Party Testing – How and When’, Eurolab
Position Paper No. 1/2000, May 2000, p 3.
29 American National Standard Institute, U.S. Conformity Assessment System: 3rd Party Conformity
Assessment, www.standardsportal.org/usa_en/conformity_assessment/3party_conformity_assess
ment.aspx#Accreditation.
30 NSF International, What Is Third-Party Certification?, www.nsf.org/about-nsf/what-is-third-party-
certification.
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serves as a signal of quality when it is issued by an independent third-party certifier.31 As
such, third-party certification provides a non-biased analysis of the product and
enhances consumer confidence in it.32
6. The following parts of this article focus on the liability of third-party certifiers.
Such certifiers provide services at the request of their client. The certificate they
issue is the performance under their certification contract. However, the certificate
can and will also be used by persons with whom third-party certifiers do not have
any contractual relationship or by the public at large. In other words, third-party
certifiers moderate informational asymmetries that distort or prevent efficient
transactions by providing the public with information it would otherwise not
have. This function is so important that one could say that without certifiers
‘efficient trade would often be distorted, curtailed or blocked’.33 Third-party certi-
fiers provide services in different sectors including the maritime industry (e.g.
classification societies34) or financial markets (e.g. CRAs35). More importantly,
third-party certifiers such as TüV Rheinland,36 SGS,37 Dekra38 or Underwriters
Laboratories (UL)39 also play a key role as notified bodies in the conformity
assessment procedure of medical devices under EU law. Considering the impor-
tance of notified bodies in this conformity assessment procedure, it is given further
attention in the next paragraphs.
2.4. Notified Bodies as Third-Party Certifiers in the Conformity
Assessment Procedure of Medical Devices: Regulatory
Framework
7. Amanufacturer can only place medical devices on the EUmarket that comply with
essential requirements.40 To that end, the manufacturer has to perform a conformity
31 G. JAHN, M. SCHRAMM & A. SPILLER, ‘The Reliability of Organic Certification: An Approach to
Investigate the Audit Quality’, Paper presented at Researching Sustainable Systems –
International Scientific Conference on Organic Agriculture, Adelaide, 21–23 Sept. 2005, p 1,
orgprints.org/4378/4/4378-Jahn_etal_4p_revised-ed.pdf.
32 European Federation of National Associations of Measurement (Testing and Analytical
Laboratories), Eurolab Position Paper No. 1/2000, May 2000, p 3.
33 J. BARNETT, ‘Intermediaries Revisited: Is Efficient Certification Consistent with Profit
Maximization?’, 37. J. Corp. Law (Journal of Corporation Law) 2012, p 476.
34 See the extensive references supra in n. 2.
35 See the extensive references supra in n. 3.
36 See for more information: www.tuv.com/en/corporate/home.jsp.
37 See for more information: www.sgsintl.com/.
38 See for more information: www.dekra-certification.com/en/home.
39 See for more information: www.ul.com/.
40 Art. 3, Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices, OJ L169, 12
July 1993.
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assessment procedure. The conformity assessment is completed in accordance with
technical procedures included in sectorial legislation dealing with a specific product
(e.g. medical devices or toys).41 Put differently, EU legislation prescribes the confor-
mity assessment procedure that has to be followed by themanufacturer. In some cases,
the assessment needs to be carried out by the manufacturer himself. However, the
applicable legislation can also require that an independent third-party certifier is
involved in the conformity assessment procedure of the product.42 In this regard,
the EU Medical Device Directive (MDD)43 as well as the Proposal for a Regulation on
Medical Devices (‘Proposal’)44 refer to notified bodies that have to be engaged in the
conformity assessment procedure of medical devices.45
A notified body is an independent entity notified by a Member State’s
competent authority. The body determines whether medical devices meet all
the applicable essential requirements to get the necessary CE marking
(Conformité Européenne). This certificate shows that the devices comply
with the applicable safety and technical requirements.46 Member States can
choose notified bodies from the entities under their jurisdiction which fulfil
the requirements set out in the MDD or the Proposal and the principles laid
down in Decision 2008/768.47 In essence, notified bodies have to operate in
a competent, non-discriminatory, transparent, neutral and independent
manner.48 Manufacturers, in their turn, are free to choose any notified body
that has been designated by Member States to carry out the conformity assess-
ment procedure of medical devices.49
8. Article 11 and Annexes II–VII of the MDD regulate the role of notified bodies
in the conformity assessment procedure of medical devices. The conformity assess-
ment procedure consists of an audit of the manufacturer’s quality system and,
41 European Commission, Conformity Assessment, ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/goods/build-
ing-blocks/conformity-assessment/index_en.htm.
42 European Commission, ‘The “Blue Guide” on the Implementation of EU Product Rules 2016’, 5
Apr. 2016, pp 62–84.
43 Art. 16, Directive 93/42/EEC.
44 Ch. IV, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on medical
devices, and amending Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 and Regulation (EC)
No 1223/2009, COM/2012/0542 final – 2012/0266 (COD), 26 June 2012.
45 European Commission, Notified Bodies, ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/goods/building-
blocks/notified-bodies/index_en.htm; European Commission, Need for Notified Body?, ec.
europa.eu/growth/single-market/ce-marking/manufacturers/notified-body/index_en.htm.
46 BSI Notified Body, Want to Know More About the Notified Body?, 2014, p 4, medicaldevices.
bsigroup.com/LocalFiles/en-GB/Services/BSI-md-notifed-body-guide-brochure-UK-EN.pdf.
47 Decision 768/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 on a
common framework for the marketing of products, and repealing Council Decision 93/465/EEC,
OJ L218/82, 13 Aug. 2008. See in this regard also: European Commission, Notified Bodies.
48 Art. R17 Decision 768/2008/EC; European Commission, Notified Bodies.
49 European Commission, Notified Bodies.
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depending on the classification of the medical device,50 a review of the technical
documentation provided by the manufacturer. Once the notified body has deter-
mined that a manufacturer or the latter’s devices comply with the applicable
criteria, the certifier issues a CE certificate.51 Chapter IV of the Proposal also
addresses the role and involvement of notified bodies in the conformity assessment
procedure. The Proposal follows the general lines of the MDD. Consequently, the
classification of devices determines the conformity assessment procedure that the
manufacturer has to follow. The conformity assessment procedures for medical
devices are further laid down in Annexes VIII–X of the Proposal. For devices of
classes IIa, IIb and III, the notified body is involved in the conformity assessment
procedure depending on the risks and class of the device. Medical devices of class
III, for instance, require a notified body’s prior approval with regard to the design
or the type of the device as well as concerning the manufacturer’s quality manage-
ment system. In the case of devices of class IIa and IIb, the notified body has to
check the quality management system and the technical documentation of the
device for representative samples.52
9. Following the PIP breast implant scandal, the European Commission issued
Recommendation 2013/473/EU on audits and assessments performed by notified
bodies in the field of medical devices.53 The Recommendation contains require-
ments for conducting unannounced audits and stipulates the obligations for both
the manufacturer and the notified body when performing such audits. Notified
bodies already had the possibility to do unannounced audits under the MDD and
the Proposal. However, Recommendation 2013/473 now obliges notified bodies to
perform unannounced audits of manufacturers of medical devices.54 More specifi-
cally, notified bodies have to carry out unannounced audits at least once every three
year. The timing of the audits should be unpredictable. Notified bodies need to
increase the frequency of unannounced audits if the devices bear a high risk, if the
devices of the type in question are frequently non-compliant or if specific informa-
tion gives rise to suspicions that the devices or their manufacturer do not comply
with the applicable requirements. Notified bodies have to check a recently
50 There are four classes of medical devices ranging from low to high risk: medical devices of class I,
IIa, IIb and III. See for more information: European Commission, DG Health & Consumer;
‘Medical Devices Guidance Document. Classification of Medical Devices’, MEDDEV 2. 4/1 Rev.
9, June 2010.
51 BSI Notified Body, Want to Know More About the Notified Body?, 2014, p 7.
52 Part 3.5. Proposal for a Regulation on medical devices.
53 Commission Recommendation 2013/473/EU of 24 Sept. 2013 on the audits and assessments
performed by notified bodies in the field of medical devices, OJ L253/27, 25 Sept. 2013.
54 See in this regard: BEC International, EU Commission Recommendation 2013/473/EU on
Unannounced Audits , www.3ec.sk/f ileadmin/user_upload/Product_Certif ication/
UNANNOUNCED_AUDITS_2014.pdf.
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produced sample, preferably one taken from the ongoing manufacturing process,
for its conformity with technical documentation and (applicable) legal
requirements.55
3. The PIP Case: Legal Consequences for Consumers at
Different Levels
10. Although the EU has addressed the involvement of notified bodies in the
conformity assessment procedure of medical devices, the PIP case revealed that
problems can, nonetheless, occur if they issue incorrect certificates. After a brief
discussion of the underlying facts (s. 3.1), it is shown that the PIP breast implant
scandal affects consumers in several ways. Court rulings in Germany (s. 3.2) and
France (s. 3.3) illustrate that women who bought the implants will not always be
successful to hold notified bodies liable and recover their losses. Considering that
issues arose with regard to the interpretation of the MDD, a prejudicial procedure
is currently pending before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (s. 3.4). The PIP
breast implant case is particularly interesting from a private international law
perspective as it poses challenges regarding jurisdiction and applicable law, for
instance due to the notion of damage and the difficulty to determine the place
where the damage occurred (s. 3.5).
3.1. Facts of the PIP Breast Implant Case
11. PIP was a French company that produced breast implants. As from 2001,
French law obliged manufacturers of breast implants to use one specific type of
medical silicone gel for their products. However, PIP did not comply with this
requirement. It developed an elaborate scheme of deceit and continued to use
sub-standard industrial silicone gel implants to cut costs. The impact of the
PIP’s fraud on the manufacturing process was quite disparate. Whereas some
implants contained the required medical silicone gel, others held a mixture of
medical and industrial silicone gel or only industrial silicone gel. The control on
the quality of the breast implants was, therefore, made extremely difficult. The
French public supervisory agency (Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des
Produits de Santé-AFSSAPS) only became aware of the problems with the PIP
implants in 2009. The implants were eventually taken off the market in early
2010.56
Hundreds of thousands of PIP implants filled with sub-standard silicone gel
were distributed around the world. Women who purchased these implants claimed
55 See in this regard: Annex III, Recommendation 2013/473/EU.
56 See for extensive description and discussion of the facts: B. VAN LEEUWEN, 5. EJRR 2014, pp 339–
340; B.M. FRY, 22. Willamette J. Int’l L. & Dispute Res. 2014, pp 169–170.
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compensation for the harm caused by their (potential) rupture. However, law suits
against manufacturer PIP were fruitless as the company went bankrupt in 2011.
Therefore, plaintiffs had to find other targets to obtain compensation for the
physical harm or the financial losses they incurred after buying the implants.
Against this background, a number of victims brought proceedings against product
certifier TüV Rheinland. TüV was the notified body that performed the conformity
assessment procedures of the breast implants. It certified the distribution of the
implants despite the devices being unsuitable for medical and cosmetic use. Claims
have been filed against the certifier in Germany as well as France. The proceedings
in both countries illustrate that holding a notified body liable is by no means
straightforward.57
3.2. Liability Claims Against TüV Rheinland in Germany
12. Several women affected by defective implants filed suits against TüV
Rheinland in Germany. The claims have, however, not been successful so far
and plaintiffs were unable to recover their losses.58 In a case before the District
Court in Nuremberg-Fürth, the victim’s claim was rejected. The court held that
EU law did not require the notified body to investigate specific implants or carry
out unannounced inspections on the manufacturing site.59 In another case, the
plaintiff received PIP breast implants in a German clinic and had them removed
because of physical injuries. She subsequently brought an action against TüV
Rheinland before the District Court Frankenthal claiming EUR 40,000 in
damages for pain and suffering and a judgment declaring the third-party certifier
liable for future material damage. Her claim was dismissed on three different
grounds.60
Firstly, the plaintiff did not establish that she had suffered any medical
harm. Secondly, she was not able to show that the specific implants she had
bought contained industrial silicone gel. Finally, the court concluded that TüV
57 B. VAN LEEUWEN, 5. EJRR 2014, pp 341–344; B.M. FRY, 22. Willamette J. Int’l L. & Dispute Res.
2014, pp 169–170.
58 See for an extensive discussion: B. VAN LEEUWEN, 5. EJRR 2014, pp 343–346.
59 Landgericht Nürnberg-Fürth, 25 Sept. 2013, 11 O 3900/13. See for a discussion: H. MÜLLER-
GERBES, ‘PIP Breast Implants: TÜV Rheinland Wins Another Case’, TüV Rheinland Press Release,
10 Apr. 2013, www.tuv.com/en/corporate/about_us_1/press/news_2/newscontent_cw_176262.
html. It should, however, be noted that such inspections are now mandatory under
Recommendation 2013/473. See for more information the discussion supra in s. 2.4.
60 Landgericht Frankenthal, 14 Mar. 2013, 6 O 304/12, JurionRS 2013, 37376, Medizin Produkte
Recht (M.P.R.) 2013, pp 134–138. See for a discussion of the decision: M. REILING & F. NIERMEIER,
‘PIP Silicone Breast Implants – German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) Puts Three Questions to
the ECJ on the Interpretation of the Medical Device Directive’, Noerr Publications, 10 Apr. 2015,
www.noerr.com/en/press-publications/News/pip-silicone-breast-implants.aspx.
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had not breached its obligations under the MDD.61 The court emphasized that
there was a distinction between duties of notified bodies on the one hand and
the obligations of national public market surveillance agencies on the other
hand. Notified bodies cannot be qualified as market surveillance agencies and
do not have the same powers. Instead, notified bodies only play a role in the
conformity assessment procedure of medical devices.62 In this regard, Annex II
of the MDD contains the obligations of a notified body. For instance, the third-
party certifier has to check the conformity of the quality management system
with the provisions of the MDD. Although the notified body undertook an
audit of the quality management system, it did not have to examine whether
the quality management as presented by PIP was also brought into practice.63
In essence, the audit of PIP’s quality system was merely a ‘document-based
exercise’.64 The notified body was also required to examine the design dossier
containing information on the content and design of the breast implants. Once
again, TüV was not obliged to inspect the actual implants.65 In addition, the
District Court held that the certifier had no obligation to perform unan-
nounced visits. The MDD stipulates that the notified body may carry out
such visits.66 An obligation would only arise if there were specific circum-
stances demanding for an unannounced visit. However, the plaintiff failed to
show the existence of such circumstances.67
13. The decision has been affirmed on appeal by the Oberlandesgericht (OLG) in
Zweibrücken albeit on different grounds. The OLG first examined whether TüV
Rheinland owed a duty of care in contract and in tort law to women who purchased
the PIP-breast implants. The court then continued its analysis to determine
whether the third-party certifier violated its duty of care.68
61 Landgericht Frankenthal, 14 Mar. 2013, 6 O 304/12, JurionRS 2013, 37376, M.P.R. 2013, pp
134–138; B. VAN LEEUWEN, 5. EJRR 2014, pp 343–344.
62 Ibid., pp 135–136; B. VAN LEEUWEN, 5. EJRR 2014, p 344.
63 Landgericht Frankenthal, 14 Mar. 2013, 6 O 304/12, JurionRS 2013, 37376, M.P.R. 2013, pp
134–137.
64 B. VAN LEEUWEN, 5. EJRR 2014, p 344.
65 Landgericht Frankenthal, 14 Mar. 2013, 6 O 304/12, JurionRS 2013, 37376, M.P.R. 2013, pp
134–137; B. VAN LEEUWEN, 5. EJRR 2014, pp 344.
66 As previously mentioned, Recommendation 2013/473 now obliges notified bodies to perform
unannounced audits of manufacturers of medical devices. See in this regard the discussion supra
in s 2.4.
67 Landgericht Frankenthal, 14 Mar. 2013, 6 O 304/12, JurionRS 2013, 37376, M.P.R. 2013, pp
134–137; B. VAN LEEUWEN, 5. EJRR 2014, p 344.
68 Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken, 30 Jan. 2014, 4 U 66/13. See for a discussion and translation of
the case: W. REHMANN & D. HEIMHALT, ‘Medical Devices: Liability of Notified Bodies?’,
TaylorWessing, May 2015, www.taylorwessing.com/synapse/may15.html; B. VAN LEEUWEN, 5.
EJRR 2014, pp 344–345.
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From a contractual point of view, the court qualified the certification
contract between PIP and TüV Rheinland as a contract for services, which did
not have protective effects towards women who purchased the breast implants.69
Certificates issued by notified bodies constitute a building block (Baustein) for
manufacturers to show that they complied with the requirements in the MDD.70
As such, the purpose and aim (Sinn und Zweck) of the certification is not to
protect third parties. The CE label given to a medical device does not provide
buyers with a right to claim compensation from the notified body involved in the
conformity assessment procedure. Instead, it is only a prerequisite for the
manufacturer to distribute the implants on the EU market. The certificate is
an indication for the national authorities that the standards of care have been
observed by the responsible parties without, however, relieving them of their
responsibility.71
The court also relied on several other arguments to deny protective
effects of the certification agreement towards women who bought the breast
implants. It held that the group of persons covered by the protective effects of
the certification contract may not be too large. More specifically, the circle of
persons who benefit from the protective effects of the agreement should be
limited to those parties in whose interest the certifier fulfils the contractual
obligations as explicitly or tacitly agreed by the contracting parties.72 The
group of persons to whom notified bodies might owe a duty of care should be
capable of being objectively determined. In other words, patients who pur-
chased the implants need to be part of a group that is objectively determinable
(objektiv abgrenzbare Personengruppe).73 The third-party certifier must have
been able to foresee that its actions could harm and affect both its co-
69 Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken, 30 Jan. 2014, 4 U 66/13, Part II, 1. b); B. VAN LEEUWEN, 5. EJRR
2014, p 344; W. REHMANN & D. HEIMHALT, TaylorWessing, May 2015. The contract with protective
effects vis-à-vis third parties is of particular importance in this regard as it ‘[opens] the contractual
umbrella’ (B.S. MARKESINIS, H. UNBERATH & A. JOHNSTON, The German Law of Contract: A
Comparative Treatise (Oxford: Hart 2002), p 207) for third parties to ‘sue a promisor [certifier]
for breach of one of the contract’s secondary obligations, notably [ … ] some breach causing purely
financial harm to the plaintiff [a third party]’ (M. BUSSANI & V. PALMER, Pure Economic Loss in
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), p 150).
70 B. VAN LEEUWEN, 5. EJRR 2014, pp 344–345.
71 Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken, 30 Jan. 2014, 4 U 66/13, Part II, 1. b); W. REHMANN & D.
HEIMHALT, TaylorWessing, May 2015.
72 Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken, 30 Jan.30, 2014, 4 U 66/13, Part II, 1. b); A. ZENNER, ‘Der
Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung zu Gunsten Dritter – Ein Institut im Lichte seiner Rechtsgrundlage’,
62. NJW (Neue Juristische Wochenschrift) 2009, pp 1030–1034; W. REHMANN & D. HEIMHALT,
TaylorWessing, May 2015.
73 BGH, 23 Jan. 1985, NJW-RR (Neue Juristische Wochenschrift-Rechtsprechungs-Report (Zeitschrift))
1986, p 486; J. JOUSSEN, Schuldrecht I – Allgemeiner Teil (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag 2008),
p 413.
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contractor as well as third parties such as the women who bought the implants.
The risk of liability must be comprehensible, calculable and enable the certifier
to seek appropriate insurance coverage.74 However, third-party certifiers do not
need to know the precise number, the name or the identity of the protected
third parties.75 Of importance is whether the expert opinion was ordered to
submit it to a group of third parties who subsequently use it to take decisions.76
In the PIP case, the contact between the patients and the manufacturer was not
sufficient to conclude that the parties bound by the certification agreement
intended to include all women who purchased the implants within its protective
scope. The risk of liability for notified bodies arising from the certification agree-
ment would become incalculable (unabsehbar) if it was accepted that TüV
Rheinland had to compensate the losses suffered by all women who bought the
implants.77 Furthermore, the manufacturer did not have a particular interest in
protecting the interest of the patients.78 It did not have any special legal relation-
ship with them and was only required by general rules of tort law and product
liability not to violate their legally protected interests/goods (Rechtsgüter) when
producing the medical device.79
The OLG Zweibrücken also concluded that TüV Rheinland did not owe a
duty of care in tort to women who bought the implants. In this regard, the plaintiffs
could have argued that the notified body breached its duty to adequately review the
manufacturer’s quality management system during the conformity assessment pro-
cedure. However, the court held that there is no general obligation to prevent
bodily harm to others. The court then refused to accept the liability of the third-
party certifier for an omission to act. In the latter hypothesis, the notified body
74 N. LAGONI, The Liability of Classification Societies, pp 202–203 with further reference in fn. 752;
M. LIEBMANN, Der Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang,
Europäische Hochschulschriften/European University Studies/Publications Universitaires
Européennes 2006), pp 118–119; Also see: BGH, 20 Apr. 2004, NJW 2004, p 3035; BGH, 18
June 1968, NJW 1968, p 1931.
75 See for example BGH, 26 Nov. 1986, NJW 1987, p 1760; BGH, 10 Nov. 1994, NJW 1995, p 392 as
referred to in N. LAGONI, The Liability of Classification Societies, pp 199 & 202–203, fn. 753.
76 N. LAGONI, The Liability of Classification Societies, p 199 with references to case law in fn. 741;
J. JOUSSEN, Schuldrecht I – Allgemeiner Teil, p 413; G. WILDMOSER, K.J. SCHIFFER & B. LANGOTH,
‘Haftung von Ratingagenturen gegenuber Anlegern?’, 10. R.I.W. (Recht der Internationalen
Wirtschaft) 2009, pp 665–666.
77 Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken, 30 Jan. 2014, 4 U 66/13, Part II, 2. b) bb); W. REHMANN &
D. HEIMHALT, TaylorWessing, May 2015.
78 M. LIEBMANN, Der Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter, p 117; B.S. MARKESINIS,
H. UNBERATH & A. JOHNSTON, The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise, p 207;
N. LAGONI, The Liability of Classification Societies, pp 198–202; A. ZENNER, 62. NJW 2009, pp
1030–1034, fn. 23.
79 Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken, 30 Jan. 2014, 4 U 66/13, Part II, 1. b) bb); W. REHMANN &
D. HEIMHALT, TaylorWessing, May 2015.
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needs to be subjected to a special obligation to act (besondere rechtliche
Verpflichtung zum Handeln). Following such an obligation, the notified body
would face liability when it does not take the necessary action to protect the legal
interests of other parties. Such a duty to act in the interests of patients may arise
from the certification agreement if there is a contractual duty of care towards
women who bought the implants and their welfare is a personal concern of the
manufacturer. This can be established by examining the intent and purpose of the
contract. However, such a conception was denied by the court as it considered that
the purpose of the certification agreement was only to allow the manufacturer to
market its devices.80
The duty to act in order to protect others can also be founded in the law. The
MDD and the Proposal are of particular importance in this regard. The objective of the
MDD is to protect patients who come into contact with medical devices. The MDD
stipulates that medical devices should provide patients and users with a high level of
protection and should attain the performance attributed to themby themanufacturer.81
The Proposal aims to establish a robust, transparent, predictable and sustainable
regulatory framework for medical devices which ensures a high degree of safety and
health.82 TheOLGZweibrücken, however, concluded that theMDDdid not impose any
statutory obligation on the notified body to intervene in order to protect all patients that
might come into contact with medical devices. The certification of a device is only a
prerequisite for placing it on theEuropeanmarket. Similar to the first instance decision,
the OLG in Zweibrücken held that notified bodies only have to perform a review based
on the documents givenby themanufacturer. They are not required to inspect the actual
products themselves. The conformity assessment procedure undertaken by TüV did not
create a guarantee that the implants complied with essential requirements in theMDD.
The decision on appeal thereby reaffirmed the separation of duties between notified
bodies on the one hand and public supervisory agencies on the other hand. Product
certification cannot be placed at the same level as post-market surveillance activities.
The national competent authorities are responsible tomonitor and control the products
that have been marketed. Considering that the third-party certifier was not required to
test the conformity of the silicon used in the implants, patients could not see the
certification of the quality management system as an indication of the quality of the
implants.83
80 Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken, 30 Jan. 2014, 4 U 66/13, Part II, 2. c); W. REHMANN &
D. HEIMHALT, TaylorWessing, May 2015.
81 Recital (5) Directive 93/42/EEC concerning medical devices.
82 Recital (1) Proposal for a Regulation on medical devices.
83 Oberlandesgericht Zweibrücken, 30 Jan. 2014, 4 U 66/13, Part II, 2. d); B. VAN LEEUWEN, 5. EJRR
2014, pp 344–3445; W. REHMANN & D. HEIMHALT, TaylorWessing, May 2015.
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3.3. Liability Claims Against TüV Rheinland in France
14. Third-party liability claims have also been filed against TüV Rheinland in
France. A large group of distributors and women brought a case before the
Tribunal de Commerce in Toulon. Contrary to the decisions in Germany, the
French court held that TüV Rheinland negligently performed its obligations of
control/inspection, care and vigilance.84 The court considered that notified bodies
effectively assume a public role and as a consequence guarantee that the product
has reached a certain standard of safety whenever they certify it. The functions
performed by TüV constituted a real delegation of public services by national
authorities.85
In its capacity of notified body, TüV Rheinland had substantial power in its
inspection role to ensure that the implants only contained the authorized gel. It was
held that the certifier was not prudent or vigilant enough as it never performed
unannounced inspections at the factory or on sites of the manufacturer to examine
the implants despite having the right to so under the MDD. One small-scale
unannounced visit would have made it possible to detect that the products did
not fall under the remit of the certified manufacturing process. If TüV would have
carried out unannounced inspections after finding out that the American Health
Authority suspended the marketing, distribution, import and use of PIP breast
implants in the US, the fraud could have been detected. In addition, TüV did also
not carry out a sufficiently rigorous review of PIP’s financial accounts. Such a
review would have revealed the abnormalities with regard to the amount of gel
bought and the volume of PIP’s production.86 The commercial court ordered TüV
Rheinland to pay a provisional compensation of EUR 3,000 per person to approxi-
mately 1,700 patients. The immediate and provisional character of the compensa-
tion was upheld and confirmed by the Cour d’Appel of Aix-En-Provence on 21
January 2014.87
84 Tribunal de Commerce Toulon, 14 Nov. 2013, n° RG 2011F00517, n° 2013F00567, p 144. See
for a discussion: N. CARBONNELLE, M.P. MARTENS, T. GORAYA & J.B. THIENOT, ‘Medical Devices
Liability Update’, Bird & Bird Publication, 17 Nov. 2015, www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/
2015/global/life-sciences-november/medical-devices-liability-update.
85 See in this regard also: B. VAN LEEUWEN, 5. EJRR 2014, pp 245–246.
86 Tribunal de Commerce Toulon, 14 Nov. 2013, n° RG 2011F00517, 2013F00567, pp 142–143; B.
VAN LEEUWEN, 5. EJRR 2014, pp 245–246; S. MASON & L. FOX, ‘French PIP/TÜV Decision: What It
Means for Medical Devices Regulation’, CMS Cameron McKenna Publications, 21 Feb. 2014, www.
lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bc1e3486-b133-4c69-9020-2a122935cc77.
87 Cour d’appel Aix-en-Provence, 21 Jan. 2014, nr. 13/00690. See in this regard also: E. MONTENS &
E. PLASSCHAERT, ‘PIP Breast Implants Patients Obtain a First 5,000,000 Euro Victory Against the
Notified Body TUV Rheinland’, Crowell & Moring Publications, 22 May 2014, www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=28a21496-a3d9-4b05-8a13-fa3027f826c8.
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15. TüV Rheinland appealed against the first instance decision. The notified body
claimed that it fully complied with the applicable requirements. TüV pertained that
it was only responsible for controlling the design and the quality system and not the
implants themselves. The certifier also argued that it had been systematically
deceived by PIP which had presented false documents. TüV did not have sufficient
powers under the MDD to take further actions to unmask the fraud. The Cour
d’Appel d’Aix-en-Provence followed this reasoning and reversed the first instance
decision which it held to be unfounded. The court of appeal concluded that TüV
Rheinland complied with its obligations under supranational law (‘les obligations
leur incombant en qualité d’organismes certificateurs’). Consequently, it did not
commit any fault engaging its tortious responsibility (‘commis de faute engageant
leur responsabilité civile délictuelle’). The role of the certifier has been defined by
the MDD. The court held that TüV only had an obligation to examine the technical
file and not the product itself. There were no elements in the file that should have
warned the notified body that approved silicone products were replaced by other
non-approved products. In addition, the MDD provides only for the possibility to
make unannounced visits and there was no obligation to do so. The decision on
appeal dismissed the claims brought by foreign distributors of PIP implants as well
as over 3,000 persons who joined the case.88
3.4. Procedure Before the European Court of Justice
16. Because of the public importance of this case and the fact that a number of
German courts were dealing with the same issues,89 the OLG Zweibrücken gave
permission to appeal to the German Bundesgerichtshof (BGH). On the 9th of April
2015, the BGH referred three questions on the interpretation of the MDD to the
ECJ.90 The first question is whether it follows from the objective and intention of
the MDD that notified bodies act with the purpose to protect all potential patients
or users of breast implants. This would imply that notified bodies may be directly
and fully liable towards patients when they negligently perform their obligations.
The second question is whether Annex II of the MDD imposes a general or at least
88 Cour d’ Appel Aix-en-Provence, 2 July 2015. The case has been reported in several (online)
journals and other sources: T. KLEIN, ‘French Court Repeals Conviction Against TÜV Rheinland
in PIP Case’, European Medical Device Technology, Regulatory and Compliance, 2 July 2015 www.
emdt.co.uk/daily-buzz/french-court-repeals-conviction-against-t%C3%BCv-rheinland-pip-case;
QMed, ‘Inspecting Company Wins Appeal in French Breast Implants Scandal’, 2 July 2015, www.
qmed.com/news/inspecting-company-wins-appeal-french-breast-implants-scandal; M. CROIZET,
‘Prothèses PIP: la justice dédouane le certificateur. Cette décision est incompréhensible’, L’OBS
Le Plus, 9 July 2015, leplus.nouvelobs.com/contribution/1395708-protheses-pip-la-justice-
dedouane-le-certificateur-cette-decision-est-incomprehensible.html.
89 See the discussion supra in s. 3.2.
90 BGH, 9 Apr. 2015 – VII ZR 36/14.
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a for-cause obligation for the notified body to test the product. The third question
concerns the extent to which Annex II of the MDD imposes a general or at least a
for-cause obligation to view business records of the manufacturer and/or to carry
out unannounced audits of the notified body.91
3.5. Private International Law Aspects & the Liability
of Third-Party Certifiers
17. The previous parts showed that the PIP scandal is a complex case with
connections to several countries around the world. The now insolvent company
PIP was located in France. Certifier TüV Rheinland, responsible for the conformity
assessment of the breast implants, has its seat in Cologne, Germany. Furthermore,
women from different nationalities and with various domiciles are affected by the
defective and substandard implants. In such multijurisdictional cases, the rules of
private international law come into play to determine the court or courts that have
jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute (s. 3.5.1). The conflict of laws rules of the
chosen forum subsequently designate the law applicable to the contractual or extra-
contractual claims (s. 3.5.2). The following paragraphs briefly attempt to touch
upon the most challenging private international law issues regarding the third-
party liability of certifiers.
3.5.1 Jurisdiction
18. In the EU, the Brussels I Recast Regulation (also known as the Brussels Ibis
Regulation) regulates the competence of the EU courts in civil and commercial
cases.92 It has replaced the Brussels I Regulation as of 10 January 2015.93 The basic
rule of the Regulation is included in Article 4 (previously Article 2 Brussels I
Regulation): jurisdiction is to be exercised by the EU Member State in which the
defendant is domiciled, regardless of his nationality (this is referred to as the forum
rei). Pursuant to Article 63.1 Brussels Ibis Regulation (previously Article 60.1
Brussels I Regulation), the domicile of companies is located in the place where
the corporation has its statutory seat, central administration or principal place of
business. In the context of the liability of third-party certifiers, the application of
this general ground of jurisdiction in Article 4 Brussels Ibis Regulation does not
pose any great difficulties. In the PIP case, TüV Rheinland falls under the ambit of
91 ECJ, C-219/15, Elisabeth Schmitt v. TÜV Rheinland LGA Products GmbH, Request for a pre-
liminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof lodged on 13 May 2015.
92 Regulation 1215/2012 of 12 Dec. 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L351/1, 20 Dec. 2012.
93 Regulation 44/2001 of 22 Dec. 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgements in civil and commercial matters, OJ L12, 16 Jan. 2001.
841
the Brussels Ibis Regulation as it has its domicile within the EU. The overview of
German case law illustrated that the certifier was indeed sued in Germany on the
basis of Article 4 as it has its headquarters in Cologne.
In addition to this general ground of jurisdiction, the Brussels Ibis
Regulation also contains, as did its predecessor the Brussels I Regulation, grounds
of special jurisdiction. These grounds make supplementary venues available to
prospective litigants. On the basis of Article 7.2 Brussels Ibis Regulation (pre-
viously Article 5.3 Brussels I Regulation), for instance, tort actions can be brought
before the courts of the place in a Member State where the harmful event occurred
or may occur. For this ground to apply, it is required that the defendant of the tort
claim is domiciled in the EU. In Bier, the ECJ established the rule of the double
forum, which states that Article 5.3 Brussels I Regulation (now Article 7.2 Brussels
Ibis Regulation) grants jurisdiction to the courts of the place where the damage
occurred (locus damni or Erfolgsort), as well as to those of the place of the event
giving rise to that damage (locus acti or Handlungsort).94 In other words, under
Article 7.2 Brussels Ibis Regulation the plaintiff has the choice to bring his case in
the courts of the place where the damaging event took place or in the place where
the damage was sustained. Contrary to the general ground of jurisdiction, the
determination of the place of the damaging event and the place of the damage in
terms of Article 7.2 Brussels Ibis Regulation is often far more complex when it
concerns third-party certifiers.
19. It should in that regard be noted that the type of wrongdoing TüV Rheinland
has committed is completely different from the one committed by PIP. The latter
has produced breast implants filled with an illicit mixture instead of the legally
required silicone gel. PIP’s actions have caused real damage (in the form of
leakages and ruptures) to several women. TüV Rheinland, on the other hand, has
allegedly failed to comply with its certification duties as a notified body. Various
women have relied – in many cases probably through their doctors – on TüV
Rheinland’s erroneous certification of the implants when making their decisions.
This difference in the inherent nature of the tort has ramifications for the applica-
tion of Article 7.2 Brussels Ibis Regulation.
20. As to the place of the damaging event, two possible interpretations can be
formulated. First, it could be argued that La Seyne-sur-Mer, the commune in
France where PIP was located, can be seen as the place of the event giving rise
to the damage. After all, TüV Rheinland performed its (very limited) inspections/
controls at PIP’s factory and it failed to discover PIP’s fraud there. On the other
hand, TüV Rheinland granted the certification from its offices in Cologne,
94 ECJ 30 November 1976, C-21/76, Handelskwekerij GJ Bier BV v. Mines de potasse d’Alsace SA
[1976] ECR 1735.
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Germany. It is there that it applied the rules in force to the material findings and
subsequently approved the CE marking.95
The existence of these two viewpoints is not academic but, on the contrary,
rather crucial as it leads to the opening of different fora. In case the first inter-
pretation is followed, victims cannot only litigate in Germany but they can also
bring their claims against the German certifier in France. If the second stance is
preferred, this option is (at least for the ‘place of the damaging event’ prong of the
double forum test) not available. The plaintiffs can only sue in Germany as TüV
Rheinland is located in Cologne and takes its certification decisions there. The
Tribunal de Commerce of Toulon, the commercial court for the region in which La
Seyne-sur-mer is located, accepted its own jurisdiction by supporting the first way
of reasoning. It held that the place where the fabrication of the implants was
inspected constituted the place of the damaging event and that this place could
totally be separated from the place of subsequent certification and CE
authorization.96
21. As to the place of the damage, it should be remarked that TüV Rheinland’s
alleged wrongdoing did not cause the harm suffered by the women. Any (past or
future) physical damage suffered due to the defective breast implants is a direct
consequence of the fraud committed by the French company PIP. The damage
sustained by the unfortunate women as a consequence of their own (or their
doctors’) reliance on TüV Rheinland’s assessment and subsequent granting of the
CE marking cannot be equated to the damage resulting from the fraudulent use of
unauthorized silicone gel. It would, therefore, be incorrect to assert that the
damage caused by Tüv Rheinland manifests itself at the place where the adverse
physical or other effects of the faulty implants were or will be felt.97 Instead, one
has to locate the place of the damage resulting from the inadequate inspection and
certification. It should be underlined that only places within the EU will be
validated in that regard as Article 7.2 Brussels Ibis Regulation only gives jurisdic-
tion to the courts of EU Member States.98
Detecting the place where a harmed woman has relied on TüV Rheinland’s
work seems to require an analysis of the mind of the patient. Such a subjective
method of establishing jurisdiction is to be avoided. In our opinion, the connecting
95 For a similar analysis in the context of the third-party liability of classification societies, another
type of certifier: J. DE BRUYNE & C. VANLEENHOVE, ‘An EU Perspective on the Liability of
Classification Societies: Selected Current Issues and Private International Issues’, 20. J.I.M.L.
(Journal of International Maritime Law) 2014, pp 116–117.
96 Tribunal de Commerce Toulon, 14 Nov. 2013, n° RG 2011F00517, n° 2013F00567, p 139.
97 See for a contrasting view on this matter: S. FULLI-LEMAIRE, ‘Affaire PIP: Quelques réflexions sur les
aspects de droit international privé’, 1. R.I.D.E 2015, p 117.
98 It is of course possible (and even highly likely) that the national rules of private international law of
the non-EU country provide for a basis of jurisdiction for the courts of that country.
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factor of the place of the breast implant operation can be put forward as a reason-
able alternative. It is there that the woman’s reliance culminates and this location
also has the benefit of being an easily determinable place. Furthermore, the
location will usually coincide with the woman’s domicile. The place of the opera-
tion, therefore, also contributes to the Brussels Ibis Regulation’s objective of
providing predictable jurisdictional rules.99 Consequently, claims might (still) be
filed against certifier TüV Rheinland in those EU Member States where women had
the breast implant surgery (e.g. England or Sweden).
The exercise naturally becomes more complex when the affected woman
participated in medical tourism, i.e. travelling from one country to another with the
sole or main objective to obtain medical treatment in that country. It could be said
that the reliance in such cases is constant and ubiquitous in the sense that the
female patient relies on the certification throughout the whole process. She per-
haps takes the decision to trust PIP implants – inspired by TüV Rheinland’s
conformity evaluation and subsequent approval – in her domicile and continues
to rely upon the German certifier’s green light during her stay abroad to undergo
surgery. Depending on the circumstances (e.g. the length of the medical stay), the
place of the operation as the place of the damage might be too accidental or
marginal and thus warrant a correction.
3.5.2 Applicable Law
22. In the private international law area of applicable law, the same issues
surrounding the notion of the place of the damaging event and the place of the
damage surface. In the EU, the private international law rules determining the law
applicable to torts have been harmonized by the Rome II Regulation.100 The
Regulation has universal application, which means that the law specified by the
Regulation shall apply, whether or not it is the law of an EU Member State (Art. 3).
The special ground for product liability in Article 5 does not apply to
the liability of certifiers. Instead, the cornerstone of the Rome II Regulation,
found in Article 4.1, comes to the foreground.101 This article states that the
law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising out of a tort shall be the
law of the country in which the damage occurs (lex loci damni) irrespective of
the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred. Only if
both the tortfeasor and the victim have their habitual residence in the same
99 See in this regard Recital (15) of Regulation 1215/2012.
100 Regulation No. 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the
law applicable to non-contractual obligations, OJ L199, 31 July 2007. The Regulation applies to all
EU Member States except Denmark.
101 A. DICKINSON, The Rome II Regulation – The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations
(Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press 2008), p 307, no. 4.22.
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country at the time the damages occurs, the law of that country will apply (Art.
4.2). Article 4.3 allows to ignore the rules of Articles 4.1 and 4.2 if it is clear
from all the circumstances of the case that the tort is manifestly more closely
connected with another country. The law of that country will then govern the
legal relationship. This escape mechanism can perhaps serve as the basis to
deviate from the application of the law of the place of the operation in cases of
accidental connection due to medical tourism.
In the PIP case, the Rome II Regulation did not come into play as the
Regulation replaced the national choice-of-law rules in non-contractual obligations
which fall within its scope only as of 11 January 2009.102 However, national rules
equally contain references to the place of the damaging event or the place of the
damage. Article 99, § 1, 2° of the Belgian Code of Private International Law, for
instance, refers to the law of the state where the damaging act and the damage
(will) occur.103
4. The Way Forward: Liability of Notified Bodies Increases
Safety of Medical Devices
23. The previous parts shed light on the decisions that have been taken by
national courts in the PIP breast implant case. The court rulings in France and
Germany did not impose liability on TüV Rheinland. However, there are several
reasons why the threat of holding notified bodies liable might increase the accuracy
and quality of certificates. This in turn contributes to the objective of EU legislation
to ensure the safety of medical devices and safeguard the health of their users. After
a brief discussion of the certification market in general (s. 4.1), the analysis
examines four reasons why the threat of liability might be an effective way to
ensure that notified bodies issue accurate certificates: the least-cost avoider argu-
ment (s. 4.2), the optimum level of care argument (s. 4.3), the spreading of risk
argument (s. 4.4) and irrational concerns with regard to opening the floodgates
(s. 4.5).104
102 Art. 32 Regulation 864/2007.
103 Act of 16 July 2004 houdende het Wetboek van internationaal privaatrecht, Belgian Official
Gazette, 27 July 2004, 57344.
104 The analysis is based on works by several (law and economics) academics: R. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law (New York: Aspen Publishers 2011), 1009 p; G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents:
A Legal and Economic Analysis (Yale: Yale University Press 1970), 350 p; G. Husisian, ‘What
Standard of Care Should Govern the World’s Shortest Editorials? An Analysis of Bond Rating
Agency Liability’, 75. Cornell L. Rev. (Cornell Law Review) 1990, p 410. See for an extensive
analysis in the field of credit rating agencies and further references: J. DE BRUYNE, ‘How the Threat
of Holding Credit Rating Agencies Liable Might Increase the Accuracy of Their Ratings’, 52.
Willamette L. Rev. (Willamette Law Review), 2016, pp 201–226.
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4.1. General Considerations About the Certification Market
24. Notified bodies and by extension other third-party certifiers must have an
incentive to issue accurate and reliable certificates. The threat of liability or
actually holding third-party certifiers liable can provide for such an incentive.105
If notified bodies are subject to a risk of liability, the likelihood of inaccurate and
flawed certificates decreases.106 In other words, the threat of liability is an effective
means of deterring wrongdoing by gatekeepers such as notified bodies.107 That is
because the objective of tort liability is the deterrence of unreasonable risks.108
105 R. Jones, ‘The Need for a Negligence Standard of Care for Credit Rating Agencies’, 1.Wm. & Mary
Bus. L. Rev. (William & Mary Business Law Review) 2010, p 226.
106 F. PARTNOY, Rethinking Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: An Institutional Investor Perspective,
San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 09-014, pp 14–16, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1430608 (accessed 26 Sep. 2016); A. DARBELLAY & F. PARTNOY, ‘Credit Rating Agencies
and Regulatory Reform’, in C.A. Hill, & B.H. McDonnell (eds), Research Handbook on the
Economics of Corporate Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2012), pp 273 & 288–289.
107 See in this regard: N.S. ELLIS, L.M. FAIRCHILD & F. D’SOUZA, 17. Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 2012, p 182;
K. DENNIS, ‘The Ratings Game: Explaining Rating Agency Failures in the Build Up to the Financial
Crisis’, 63. U. Miami L. Rev. (University of Miami Law Review) 2009, pp 1140–1141; S. HARPER,
‘Credit Rating Agencies Deserve Credit for the 2007–2008 Financial Crisis: An Analysis of CRA
Liability Following the Enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act’, 68. Wash. & Lee L. Rev. (Washington
and Lee Law Review) 2011, pp 1957–1972. See in general: S.A. LAW & S. POLAN, Pain and Profit:
The Politics of Malpractice (New York: Harper & Row 1978), 305 p; R. Posner, Economic Analysis
of Law, p 1009; J.C. COFFEE, Gatekeepers: The Role of the Professions in Corporate Governance
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006), 400 p; F. Partnoy, ‘The Paradox of Credit Ratings’, in R.M.
Levich, G. Majnoni & C. Reinhart(EDS), Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System
(New York: Kluwer 2002), p 65. When third-party certifiers do not merely provide information in
the form of an attestation but thereby restrict and control the access of the certified product to the
market, they serve as gatekeepers. Considering that EU law requires the involvement of notified
bodies in the conformity assessment of certain medical devices before a manufacturer can place
them on the market, they can indeed be considered as parties keeping the gate to the EU market.
See for an extensive discussion on the concept of gatekeeper: R. KRAAKMAN, ‘Gatekeepers: The
Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy’, 2. J.L.E.P. (Journal of Law, Economics & Policy)
1986, p 53; S. MAVROMMATI, ‘The Dynamics of Gatekeepers, Corporate Culture and Whistle
Blowers’, 1. Corp. Governance L. Rev. (Corporate Governance Law Review) 2005, p 385; J.C.
COFFEE, Gatekeepers: The Role of the Professions in Corporate Governance p 400; A. LABY,
‘Differentiating Gatekeepers’, 1 Brook. J. Corp., Fin. & Com. L. (Brooklyn Journal of Corporate,
Financial & Commercial Law) 2006, p 119; S. KIM, ‘Gatekeepers Inside Out’, 21. Geo. J. Legal
Ethics (Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics) 2008, p 411; A. HAMDANI, ‘Gatekeeper Liability’, 77. S.
Cal. L. Rev. (Southern California Law Review) 2004, p 53; F. PARTNOY, ‘Barbarians at the
Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime’, 79. Wash. U.L.Q. (Washington
University Law Quarterly) 2001, p 491; L.A. CUNNINGHAM, ‘Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective
Gatekeepers’, 92. Minn. L. Rev. (Minnesota Law Review) 2007, p 323.
108 D. ROSENBERG, ‘The Judicial Posner on Negligence Versus Strict Liability: Indiana Harbor Belt
Railroad Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co’, 120. Harv. L. Rev. (Harvard Law Review) 2007, p 1212 citing
Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 662 F. Supp. 635, 1181–1182 (N.D. Ill. 1987); A.
D. MILLER & R. PERRY, ‘The Reasonable Person’, 82. N.Y.U. L. Rev. (New York University Law
846
However, the threat of liability and holding notified bodies liable only seems useful
if two conditions are met.109
25. Firstly, there should be no other mechanisms or incentives that already make
notified bodies issue accurate certificates. In essence, the threat of liability has to
be a conditio sine qua non for reliable certificates due to the lack of alternatives that
ensure this aim.110 This arguably is the case considering that the PIP scandal
illustrated that reputational constraints alone did not prevent TüV Rheinland
from issuing incorrect certificates.111 Moreover, one can think of other ways to
safeguard that third-party certifiers issue accurate certificates. In this regard,
reference can be made to a number of (innovative) proposals in the field of other
third-party certifiers such as CRAs and classification societies. These include tax or
financial incentives, more control and supervision by (international) governmental
bodies, minimizing conflicts of interest and even entirely reorganizing the certifi-
cation process.112 Arguably, those measures to increase the accuracy of certificates
Review) 2012, p 328 (writing that ‘[a]ccording to economic wisdom, this deterrence of unreason-
able risk is the primary objective of tort liability’).
109 See for further references: J. DE BRUYNE, 52. Willamette L. Rev. 2016, pp 206–210.
110 G. Husisian, 75. Cornell L. Rev. 1990, p 440 (referring to R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law
(Boston: Little Brown and Company 1986), pp 513–514); F.H. Easterbrook & D.R. FISCHEL,
‘Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors’, 70. Va. L. Rev. (Virginia Law Review)
1984, p678.
111 See in this regard the analysis supra in part 3. Also see: K. DENNIS, 63. U. Miami L. Rev. 2009, pp
1131–1140.
112 See for credit rating agencies: M. GUDZOWSKI, ‘Mortgage Credit Ratings and the Financial Crisis:
The Need for a State-Run Mortgage Security Credit Rating Agency’, 1. Colum. Bus. L. Rev.
(Columbia Business Law Review) 2010, p 101; M. BUSSANI, ‘Credit Rating Agencies’
Accountability: Short Notes on a Global Issue’, 10. Global Jurist 2010, p 1; T.E. LYNCH, ‘Deeply
and Persistently Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies in the Current Regulatory Environment’, 59.
Case W. Res. L. Rev. (Case Western Reserve Law Review) 2009, p 227; O. SCHMID, ‘Rebuilding the
Fallen House of Cards: A New Approach to Regulating Credit Rating Agencies’, 3. Colum. Bus. L.
Rev. (Columbia Business Law Review) 2012, p 994; N.D. HORNER, ‘If You Rate It, He Will Come:
Why Uncle Sam’s Recent Intervention with the Credit Rating Agencies Was Inevitable and
Suggestions for Future Reform’, 41. Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (Florida State University Law Review)
2014, p 489; J. MANNS, ‘Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Approach for
Rating Agency Accountability’, 87. N.C. L. Rev. (North Carolina Law Review) 2009, p 1011; R.J.
RHEE, ‘On Duopoly and Compensation Games in the Credit Rating Industry’, 108. Nw. U. L. Rev.
(Northwestern University Law Review) 2013, p 85; Y. LISTOKIN & B. TAIBLESON, ‘If You Misrate,
then You Lose: Improving Credit Rating Accuracy Through Incentive Compensation’, 27. Yale J.
on Reg. (Yale Journal on Regulation) 2010, p 91; P. HOSP, ‘Problems and Reforms in Mortgage-
Backed Securities: Handicapping the Credit Rating Agencies’, 79. Miss. L.J. (Mississippi Law
Journal) 2010, p 531. See for classification societies: L. LINDFELT, ‘A Future for Classification
Societies’, CMI Yearbook 1994, pp 253–254; N. LAGONI, The Liability of Classification Societies, pp
26–35; M. HAYASHI, ‘Toward the Elimination of Substandard Shipping: The Report of the
International Commission on Shipping’, 16. Int’l J Marine & Coastal L. (International Journal of
Marine & Coastal Law) 2003, p 508.
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could also be used for notified bodies as they are confronted with similar problems
(e.g. the conflict of interest that arises because the manufacturer of the medical
devices pays the notified body to certify the devices, the so-called issuer-pays
business model113). However, most of these suggestions to increase the quality of
certificates have not (yet) been adopted by supra- and national legislators in the
field of rating agencies and classification societies.114 It thus remains unlikely that
they would suddenly be enacted for notified bodies involved in the conformity
assessment of medical devices. In sum, there is currently no alternative available
to safeguard that notified bodies issue accurate certificates, which makes the
reliance on (the threat of) liability even more likely.
26. Secondly, liability only holds merit if the judicial system is capable of
determining when a notified body acted negligently or when the certificate is
incorrect.115 Notified bodies will obviously not be held liable towards third parties
if courts are unable to detect such conduct. Judges might, for instance, not have the
proper technical expertise and knowledge and might ‘have great difficulty distin-
guishing significant factors from insignificant ones’.116 Even though consumers can
file suits against notified bodies for their alleged misconduct, proceedings will in
most cases be fruitless.117 Adopting a negligence-based standard might thus increase
claims against notified bodies but at the same time not enhance the welfare of
consumers or encourage notified bodies to attain a higher level of care if courts
are unable to actually hold them liable. In addition, imposing liability upon notified
bodies might require substantial oversight by the government especially in develop-
ing the necessary performance standards. This in turn can lead to additional costs
which will eventually be passed on by the notified body to the purchaser of the
medical devices.118 However, things need to be nuanced. The first instance decision
by the French court in Toulon illustrates that courts do have the technical capacity to
determine whether a notified body acted negligently. Courts are not afraid to hold
notified bodies liable if they did not act with sufficient care and lacked reasonable
grounds to issue the certificate.119 The concern of the government’s creation of
performance standards also needs to be seen in a more optimistic light. The
European Commission already adopted regulations and requirements regulating
113 See in this regard: L. BAI, ‘On Regulating Conflict of Interests in the Credit Rating Industry’, 13. N.
Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y (N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation & Public Policy) 2010, p 254.
114 See for an overview in the context of credit rating agencies: J. DE BRUYNE, 52. Willamette L. Rev.
2016, pp 176–201.
115 G. HUSISIAN, 75. Cornell L. Rev. 1990, p 440; J. DE BRUYNE, 52. Willamette L. Rev. 2016, p 208.
116 G. HUSISIAN, 75. Cornell L. Rev. 1990, pp 440 & 443–444.
117 J.D. KREBS, ‘The Rating Agencies: Where We Have Been and Where Do We Go From Here’, 3. J.
Bus. Entrepreneurship & L (Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law) 2009, p 158.
118 M. GUDZOWSKI, 1. Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 2010, p 132; J. DE BRUYNE, 52. Willamette L. Rev. 2016, p
208.
119 See the discussion supra in s. 3.
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the involvement of notified bodies in the conformity assessment procedure of med-
ical devices. As such, legislators and regulators would not have to start from an
empty sheet when implementing (additional) legislation.120 Against this background,
the following paragraphs discuss a number of arguments why the threat of liability
ensures that notified bodies issue accurate certificates.
4.2. The Least-Cost Avoider Argument and Liability for Notified
Bodies
27. Under the least-cost avoider argument, the tort system should impose liability
on the least-cost avoider of mistakes. The latter is the actor which will incur the
least amount of costs if it was the one tasked to prevent the harm (e.g. injuries
because of leaking implants). In the certification business, the notified body might
be one of the least-cost avoiders of mistakes (e.g. defective breast implants). Not
only because of its expertise and access to the manufacturer’s confidential informa-
tion but also because it would cost consumers much more to examine the quality of
each individual breast implant.121 Courts founding their decision on the least-cost
avoider argument would, therefore, be inclined to impose liability on notified
bodies as they are able to prevent potential mistakes at a lower cost than
consumers.122
At the same time, liability for notified bodies might result in increased costs
for the latter in terms of monitoring and recordkeeping. These costs will be passed
on to manufacturers resulting in higher certification fees and will, therefore,
ultimately lead to higher prices for medical devices.123 The problem is that those
monitoring and recordkeeping requirements do not necessarily improve certificates
or render medical devices safer. They only serve as evidence that a notified body
carefully performed its activities and did not act negligently when issuing the
certificates. The costs associated with maintaining the documents and records are
thus wasted from a societal point of view as they have not been invested in making
more accurate certificates or safer devices.124 As such, the imposition of liability
would be nothing more than a waste of resources because it actually does not
increase the social welfare and health of consumers.125 Notified bodies might also
120 See the discussion supra in s. 2.
121 G. HUSISIAN, 75. Cornell L. Rev. 1990, p 431.
122 G. HUSISIAN, 75. Cornell L. Rev. 1990, pp 430–431; J. DE BRUYNE, 52. Willamette L. Rev. 2016, p
210.
123 C.M. MULLIGAN, ‘From AAA to F: How the Credit Rating Agencies Failed America and What Can Be
Done to Protect Investors’, 50. B.C.L. Rev. (Boston College Law Review) 2009, pp 1296–1297.
124 G. HUSISIAN, 75. Cornell L. Rev. 1990, p 434.
125 G. WAGNER, ‘Gatekeeper Liability: A Response to the Financial Crisis’, Paper presented at the Law
and Economics Workshop of Tel Aviv University, Aug. 2013, pp 16–19, ssrn.com/
abstract=2317213.
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need more time and efforts to certify products if they face the risk of being held
liable for defective products. Consequently, they will spend more time preparing
the certificates during the conformity assessment procedure, which could delay
manufacturers in marketing devices that require a certificate.126
However, even if the concerns in the previous paragraph might be true,
encouraging notified bodies to spend more time and care when issuing certi-
ficates is a ‘laudable goal’.127 Moreover, holding notified bodies liable could
make a difference in terms of ‘allocative efficiency’.128 Allocative efficiency
implies that there is an optimal distribution of goods and services responding
to the preferences of consumer.129 More specifically, if certificates are accurate
and reliable, consumers will not have to investigate the products and incur the
costs associated with such examination. On the other hand, if certificates are
unreliable, consumers will be exposed to costs because they will have to make
sure that the devices they purchase are safe. Each consumer would have to
collect and analyse information about the device, seek advice from other
experts in the medical sector or perform their own analysis before buying the
manufacturer’s medical devices. The costs associated with such activities might
be substantial compared to a situation in which only one expert institution,
namely the notified body, issues a reliable certificate that can be used by all
consumers.130
4.3. The Optimum Level of Care Argument and Liability of
Notified Bodies
28. The optimum level of care is another argument relied on to advocate
liability for notified bodies. In an ideal world, manufacturers might contract
with another notified body or pay less certification fees when discovering that
the initial certificate for a device is inaccurate. Consequently, the hired notified
body would have to reduce the price of its certification services to reflect the
below-optimum investment in accuracy. Put differently, the notified body will
have to increase its investment in accuracy in order to avoid lowering the price
126 B.H. BROWNLOW, ‘Rating Agency Reform: Presenting the Registered Market for Asset-Backed
Securities’, 15. N.C. Banking Inst. J. (North Carolina Banking Institute Journal) 2011, p 133; J.
DE BRUYNE, 52. Willamette L. Rev. 2016, pp 210–211.
127 N.S. ELLIS, L.M. FAIRCHILD & F. D’SOUZA, 17. Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 2012, p 216.
128 G. WAGNER, Paper presented at the Law and Economics Workshop of Tel Aviv University, Aug.
2013, p 19.
129 S. ROTHLIN & D. MCCANN, International Business Ethics: Focus on China (Berlin: Springer 2015), p
465.
130 G. WAGNER, Paper presented at the Law and Economics Workshop of Tel Aviv University, Aug.
2013, p 20; J. DE BRUYNE, 52. Willamette L. Rev. 2016, pp 211–213.
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or losing market share to other notified bodies that offer more accurate and
reliable certification services.131
However, notified bodies will invest in the accuracy of certificates only until
the marginal cost of doing so equals the increase in marginal revenue achieved by
displaying greater accuracy. Consequently, notified bodies are allowed to make
some errors caused by underinvestment in accuracy, as these will remain undiscov-
ered. The investment in the accuracy of certificates can also lead to a marginal
change in revenue which is less than the benefits of not investing in an optimal
level of accuracy. As such, underinvesting in the accuracy of certificates sometimes
becomes a rational profit-maximizing strategy for notified bodies. The threat of
liability in case notified bodies do not sufficiently invest in accuracy might, there-
fore, increase the standard of care that notified bodies will display. A notified body
would have to consider whether it is exposing itself to potential liability for any
degree of negligence by its failure to invest in the accuracy of certificates. Imposing
the costs of underinvesting in the accuracy of certificates on notified bodies might
thus create an incentive to not act negligently.132
4.4. Risk Spreading Argument and Liability of Notified Bodies
29. A further argument why notified bodies should face liability is related to
the spreading of risk. Notified bodies will internalize potential costs in the
certification fee if courts threaten to hold them liable for negligent conduct.
Consequently, notified bodies will charge higher prices for their services and
transfer these costs to the manufacturer paying for the certification services.
Notified bodies can shift these costs to the extent that the manufacturers are
willing to bear the increased costs of the certification. Consequently, notified
bodies that on average act more negligent than their competitors will have
higher costs to pass on to the manufacturer. This might alarm manufacturers
and consumers that such bodies are not issuing accurate and reliable certifi-
cates. Underinvesting notified bodies will, therefore, be forced to invest in the
accuracy of their certificates if they want to avoid losing business to other
notified bodies that provide more accurate services.133
Furthermore, notified bodies derive a major part of their income from
certification fees. In order to cover the potential costs of liability, they will have
an incentive to charge higher prices to those manufacturers who misrepresent their
products or provide poor information with regard to the latter (as was the situation
131 G. HUSISIAN, 75. Cornell L. Rev. 1990, pp 430–432.
132 G. HUSISIAN, 75. Cornell L. Rev. 1990, pp 431–432; J. DE BRUYNE, 52. Willamette L. Rev. 2016, pp
213–214.
133 G. HUSISIAN, 75. Cornell L. Rev. 1990, pp 432–434; J. DE BRUYNE, 52. Willamette L. Rev. 2016, pp
214–216.
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in the PIP case). They will pass on the costs of potential liability to those manu-
facturers that gave inaccurate information in the past or appear to not disclose all
information with regard to a medical device. As a result, manufacturers are encour-
aged to provide the most accurate information possible with regard to a device on
which the certificate will subsequently be based. If manufactures fail to provide
accurate information concerning the device, the cost of marketing will raise
because of the higher certification fees. In essence, a higher level of accurateness
of certificates as well as safer products are also achieved by the threat of holding
notified bodies liable as it triggers the least-cost providers of information, namely
the manufacturers themselves, to give information of sufficient quality.134
4.5. Floodgate Concerns and Liability of Notified Bodies
30. Finally, there is the concern that, even if liability for gatekeepers has the effect
of deterring bad behaviour, it might encourage frivolous litigation and open the
floodgates against gatekeepers. This would have dramatic consequences for the
certification business as a whole.135 However, the threat of liability cannot be equated
to the actual liability of notified bodies. After all, plaintiffs often have to prove several
elements for their liability claims against third-party certifiers to be successful.136
From a Belgian perspective, for instance, and in the absence of specific legisla-
tion on the liability of notified bodies, consumers have to base their claims on Articles
1382–1383 of the Belgian Civil Code (BCC) to recover in tort from the notified body.
Pursuant to Articles 1382–1383 BCC, a plaintiff will have to prove that the notified
body committed a wrongful act (faute), that he incurred damage (dommage) and that
there is a causal link between both elements (lien de causalité).137 As such, courts will
not automatically hold notified bodies liablemerely because they have already incurred
liability in the past.138 Reference can in this regard bemade to Belgian case law dealing
with the liability of other third-party certifiers such as classification societies. A third
134 G. HUSISIAN, 75. Cornell L. Rev. 1990, pp 433–434; J. DE BRUYNE, 52. Willamette L. Rev. 2016, pp
214–216.
135 See in this regard: C. HILL, ‘Regulating Rating Agencies’, 82. Wash. U. L. Q (Washington
University Law Quarterly) 2004, p 89; C.M. Mulligan, 50. B.C.L. Rev. 2009, p 1297; N.D.
HORNER, 41. Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 2014, p 504; A. Pinto, ‘Control and Responsibility of Credit
Rating Agencies in the United States’, 54. Am. J. Comp. L. (American Journal of Comparative
Law) 2006, p 355.
136 N.S. ELLIS, L.M. FAIRCHILD & F. D’SOUZA, 17. Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 2012, p 217. See for an extensive
analysis in the context of credit rating agencies: J. DE BRUYNE, 52.Willamette L. Rev. 2016, pp 218–222.
137 H. BOCKEN, I. BOONE & M. KRUITHOF, Het buitencontractueel aansprakelijkheidsrecht en andere
schadevergoedingsmechanismen (Brugge: die Keure 2014), pp 46–203. See in the context of
providers of information to the public the decision by the Court of Appeal Antwerp, 12 Sept.
2012, NJW (Nieuw Juridisch Weekblad) 2014, p 130 with annotation by J. DE BRUYNE.
138 See for an extensive discussion of these requirements in the context of the PIP case: J. DE BRUYNE,
‘PIP-implantaten: certificeringsdienst steekt hand best in eigen boezem’, De Juristenkrant 2014, p 3.
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party (e.g. cargo-owner or ship insurer) has to prove in each case that he incurred
damage (e.g. financial losses or physical harm) and that there was a causal link with the
issuance of the incorrect certificate even when courts already held the certifier liable
towards third parties at several occasions in the past.139
Another case which shows that themere possibility of holding certifiers liable will
not open the floodgates is the Vie d’Or decision in which the Dutch Supreme Court set
the boundaries of the third-party liability of the auditor. The Hoge Raad held that
accountants have a duty of care towards third parties when performing tasks that have
a wider public importance such as the certification and control of annual accounts.140 To
determine whether auditors can be held liable towards a specific third party, the judge
needs to examinehowa reasonable and competent accountantwhocarefully performshis
duties and takes into account the third party’s interests, would have acted.141 Whether
the accountant violated his duty of care has to be established by taking all circumstances
of the case into account.142 The Hoge Raad subsequently enumerated a checklist to
decide if the accountant violated his duty of care. Factors that have to be taken into
account are (1) the extent to which the requirements concerning financial audit report-
ing incorporated inEUandnational legislation have been respected, (2) the nature of the
violated norm, (3) the seriousness of the violation, (4) themeasures taken or information
given by the accountant to limit the financial loss, (5) the degree towhich the accountant
could reasonably foresee that the impairment of third-party pecuniary interests would
result in economic loss, and (6) the extent to which the accountant took those control
measures and issued warning statements that could reasonably be expected from him in
the given situation in order to avoid the economic loss.143 Besides the violation of the
auditor’s duty of care, the other requirements to base a claim on Article 6:162 of the
Dutch Civil Code (DCC) must also be established. For instance, there must be a causal
link between the auditor’s violation of his duty of care and the incurred financial losses by
the third party. TheHoge Raad eventually concluded in the Vie d’Or case that the Court
of Appeal erred in finding that there was a causal link. The auditor was, therefore, not
held liable.144
139 In the context of classification societies, the following cases illustrate that a third party has to
establish a fault, damage and a causal link between the loss he suffered and the incorrect class
certificate: Spero, Court of Appeal Antwerp, 14 Feb. 1995, R.H.A. (Rechtspraak Haven van
Antwerpen) 1995, pp 325–327; Paula, Court of Appeal Antwerp, 10 May 1994, R.H.A. 1995, pp
313–317.
140 Hoge Raad, 13 Oct. 2006, J.O.R. (Jurisprudentie Onderneming & Recht) 2006, p 296, para. 5.4.1.
141 Hoge Raad, 13 Oct. 2006, J.O.R. 2006, p 296, para. 5.3.
142 Ibid., p 296, para. 5.4.2.
143 Ibid., p 296, para. 5.4.2.
144 Ibid., p 296, para. 6.4.2. See for a discussion; I. GIESEN, Bewijslastverdeling bij beroepsaansprake-
lijkheid (Deventer: Tjeenk Willink 1999), pp 77–78; B. TEN DOESSCHATE & R. EEKHOF,
‘Aansprakelijkheid van de accountant jegens derden’, 2. Financiële Studievereniging Amsterdam
2008, pp 50–51; H.J. BLAISSE, ‘De reikwijdte van de derdenaansprakelijkheid van de accountant
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5. Concluding Remarks
31. The article dealt with the liability of notified bodies acting as third-party
certifiers in the medical sector. More specifically, the contribution discussed the
role of TüV Rheinland in the PIP breast implant case. The decisions that have been
issued so far in France and Germany denied compensation for patients who pur-
chased the defective PIP breast implants. Several strict requirements had to be
established before consumers could claim recovery. The PIP case is currently
pending before the European Court of Justice. As such, it remains to be seen
what stance the ECJ will take and especially what the consequences might be for
notified bodies. This uncertainty is to the detriment of women who are affected by
the defective PIP breast implants. A brief intermezzo showed that challenges also
remain from a private international law perspective. Third-party certifiers can be
sued before the courts of their domicile. Whether they can be brought before courts
in other Member States depends inter alia on the interpretation of the place of the
damaging event and the place of the damage. The difficulty to pinpoint these
locations not only emerges in the field of jurisdiction but also manifest itself within
the search for the applicable law as identical connecting factors are employed in
that area of private international law.
In sum, at the moment the situation looks rather negative for women
affected by defective PIP breast implants. The decision by the ECJ might bring
clarity in this regard. Within the confines of that decision, it has to be examined
how the liability of notified bodies should be given form within the existing
supranational regulatory framework on medical devices. However, one thing
seems clear: the threat of holding notified bodies liable might increase the accuracy
of their certificates issued during the conformity assessment procedure of medical
devices. This subsequently ensures that only safe medical devices are placed on the
EU market and safeguards the health of consumers. Future scandals with medical
devices and negligent third-party certifiers might in this way be prevented.
“Het grijze gebied tussen altijd en nooit”’, 3. Ondernemingsrecht 2013, p 3; J. DE BRUYNE, 52.
Willamette L. Rev. 2016, pp 218–223.
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